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Abstract: 
The main aim of this study is to investigate the association between 
some board of directors characteristics (board independence, board size, 
board meetings and role duality) and the level of voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports of listed banks in Borsa Istanbul 
The deductive approach was adopted by developing hypotheses 
based on the relevant theories and findings of previous studies. Also, the 
panel data strategy was applied to analyze the collected data from annual 
reports across five years (2013-2017). The univariate statistical analysis and 
the multivariate Feasible Generalized Least Squares regression model are 
used in this study. 
The results showed that board independence, board size and board 
meetings were positively and significantly associated with the level of 
voluntary disclosure, whilst role duality was negatively but no significantly 
associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. The results also indicated 
that all bank characteristics were positively and significantly associated with 
the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Most prior studies on voluntary disclosure practices have been 
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undertaken in the developed countries and a few of them have focused on 
voluntary disclosure practices in the banking sector during a number of 
years (longitudinally). There is a requirement for more empirical studies in 
this area to confirm or disprove the previous results. This study will add 
value to the knowledge in the disclosure literature by clarifying the 
relationship between the board of directors' characteristics and voluntary 
disclosure in the banking sector of developing countries. 
Keywords: Board of Directors Characteristics, Borsa Istanbul, Voluntary 
Disclosure.  
JEL Classification: M4, M41. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With the increase of globalization in the world’s financial markets in 
recent years, voluntary disclosure has gotten much attention in the 
accounting literature. Voluntary disclosure is required to decrease the 
conflict of interests between management and shareholders because it 
increases transparency which means that managers will not be able to hold 
important information for their interest. Therefore, asymmetry problem and 
managers’ opportunistic behaviors will decrease. 
Agency theory assumes that the presence of the conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders denotes to the absence of full disclosure 
(Lev & Penman, 1990). Barako, Hancock, & Izan (2006) indicate that 
publishing more voluntary information reduces agency costs. Also, 
signaling theory suggests that managers who have more information signal 
to stakeholders, the information asymmetry problem can be diminished 
(Spence, 1973). Therefore, managers reveal more information to attempt 
diminishing users’ uncertainty which decrease the capital cost, and convince 
the external users that they are working in a perfect way (Watson, Shrives, 
& Marston, 2002). 
Mandatory disclosure is not enough to get capital as cheap as 
possible. The capital need theory infers that managers have a motive to 
disclose further information for raising capital on the best possible terms 
and lower cost (Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995). Consequently, voluntary 
disclosure leads to higher demand for securities which leads to low cost of 
capita (Dye, 1985; Verrecchia, 1983). 
The level of voluntary disclosure varies from one firm to another 
because of some factors (Abeywardana & Panditharathna, 2016). One of 
these factors is the board of directors which is viewed as an effective and 
important corporate governance mechanism. The board of directors has the 
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responsibility of disclosing the financial and non-financial information 
through preparing and publishing the annual reports to the related parties. 
Agency theory suggests that the board needs to be effective in order to 
protect the interests of shareholders (Ramadhan, 2014). The board 
effectiveness is influenced by some board characteristics such as 
composition, size, the duality of CEO and board diversity (Brennan, 2006). 
Therefore, the characteristics of the board are expected to impact voluntary 
disclosure decisions.  
This study aims to examine the relationship between some board of 
directors characteristics (board independence, board size, board meetings 
and role duality) and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 
of listed banks in Borsa Istanbul. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Board of directors characteristics are viewed as one of the important 
determinants of voluntary disclosure. The commonly board of directors 
characteristics that have been tested in the relevant literature are the board 
independence, board size, board meetings and role duality). 
 
2.1. Board Independence and Voluntary Disclosure 
Independent directors system can play many positive roles such as 
developing the scientific, efficient, safety of the decision-making process, 
strengthening the competitiveness of the company, and preventing the 
president and other internal directors in the company from doing whatever 
they want (Zhang, Li, & Zhang, 2011). Resource dependence theory 
indicates that independent directors have the expertise, prestige, and 
communications that allow them to link companies to the external 
environment (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000). Agency theory infers that independent directors play a vital role in 
overseeing the managers' performance and limiting their opportunism (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983). Therefore, it is expected that independent directors are to 
be more effective in satisfying shareholders' interests for accountability and 
transparency, and hence more relevant disclosure is expected (Moumen, 
Ben Othman, & Hussainey, 2016). 
The results of previous studies were not consistent in relation to the 
association between the percentage of independent directors and the 
voluntary disclosure level. Several studies found a positive significant 
relationship between these two variables (Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain, & 
Yao, 2009; Babío Arcay & Muiño Vázquez, 2005; Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 
2007; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008; Gisbert & 
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Navallas, 2013; Grassa & Chakroun, 2016; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Uyar, 
Kilic, & Bayyurt, 2013) and some studies found a negative relationship 
(Abeywardana & Panditharathna, 2016; Eng & Mak, 2003; Habbash, 
Hussainey, & Awad, 2016; Matoussi & Chakroun, 2009; Rouf, 2011), and 
others found no significant relationship (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Allegrini 
& Greco, 2013; Hieu & Lan, 2015; Khodadadi, Khazami, & Aflatooni, 
2010; Zhang et al., 2011). Accordingly, it is expected that board 
independence will improve voluntary disclosure as predicted by agency 
theory. Hence, the hypothesis is developed as follows : 
H1: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. 
 
2.2. Board Size and Voluntary Disclosure 
The optimum size of the board of directors is a critical matter for any 
firm. The board with a big size is difficult to coordinate; the small is a 
favorable field of coordination, but the members may suffer from a shortage 
of experience and competence (Matoussi & Chakroun, 2009). There is no 
superiority of theory or empirical evidence to suggest a relationship between 
board size and the level of voluntary disclosure, and it is still an empirical 
issue (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006).  However, Yermack (1996) discusses that 
the large number of directors assist to improve the expertise in the company 
which may lead to increasing the quality of the disclosure. Some previous 
empirical studies found that firms with large board size were more likely to 
disclose more information voluntarily compared to companies with small 
boards (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Htay, 2012; 
Rouf, 2011). Based on the results of these studies, the following hypothesis 
is developed: 
H2: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with the 
number of the board of directors. 
 
2.3. Board Meetings and Voluntary Disclosure 
Recurrence of the board of directors meetings represents the board 
activity which influences the ability of the board to work as an effective 
overseeing mechanism in decreasing agency conflicts (Xie, Davidson III, & 
Dadalt, 2003). Agency theory suggests that the board meetings frequency 
influence the  strength of the component of corporate governance (Khanchel, 
2007). Man et al. (2013) point out that the board meetings numbers are 
considered as a good proxy to evaluate the effectiveness of  board 
performance and internal corporate governance. It is expected that 
increasing the oversight leads to decreasing information asymmetry and 
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lower agency costs, thereby increasing disclosures (Nelson, Gallery, & 
Percy, 2010). 
Empirically, there is not enough evidence on the nature of the 
association between voluntary disclosure and board meetings. For example, 
Allegrini & Greco (2013) found that there is a significant positive 
relationship between the meeting frequency and the voluntary disclosure 
level. Whilst, the results of the study of Albawwat & Basah (2015) showed 
that the frequency of board meetings has an insignificant influence on 
voluntary disclosure of interim financial reporting in Jordan. Hence, based 
on the above discussion, it is expected that voluntary disclosure is to be 
related positively with the number of board meetings.  Consequently, the 
study hypothesized that:  
H3: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with the 
number of board meetings. 
 
2.4.  Role Duality and Voluntary Disclosure 
According to agency theory, the role duality limits the directors' 
ability to oversee CEO which may affect on board independence and 
increase agency problem (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Therefore, it is 
necessary to separate between CEO and chairman in order to allow the 
board to put the CEO and management under the pressure of disclosing 
more information (Ramadhan, 2014). 
Most empirical studies found that role duality is negatively 
associated with voluntary disclosure (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Forker, 
1992; Gisbert & Navallas, 2013; Gul & Leung, 2004; Huafang & Jianguo, 
2007; Samaha, Khlif, & Hussainey, 2015). On the other hand, results of 
some studies showed that there is no   significant association between role 
duality and voluntary disclosure (Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2010; Cheng 
& Courtenay, 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hieu & Lan, 2015; Khodadadi 
et al., 2010; Ramadhan, 2014; Yuen, Liu, Zhang, & Lu, 2009). Accordingly, 
the hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H4: The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with 
role duality. 
 
3. Methodology  
The deductive approach was adopted by developing hypotheses 
based on the relevant theories and findings of previous empirical studies. 
The data was collected from annual reports of listed banks in Borsa Istanbul 
across five years (2013-2017). Also, quantitative research design and 
longitudinal research (panel data) strategy were applied. The study used the 
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content analysis technique in order to gather data. The sample of the study is 
represented by all listed banks (13 banks) in Borsa Istanbul (BIST BANKS) 
until the end of 2017. 
 
3.1. Measuring the Dependent Variable 
To measure the level of voluntary disclosure, an unweighted 
voluntary disclosure index is used by developing a checklist contains 64 
voluntary disclosure items split into six categories according to their nature 
(Appendix No.(1)). Then, giving a score of (1) if an item is disclosed and 
(0) if not. The voluntary disclosure index score (VDI) for all annual reports 
of banks was calculated as a proportion of the actual voluntary disclosure 
score (AVD) to the maximum voluntary disclosure score (MVD) as noted 
below in equation (1). 
                    VDI = ……………………………..... (1) 
Where: 
 VDI = Voluntary Disclosure Index, 
 AVD = Actual Voluntary Disclosure score (i = 1 if the item is 
disclosed; i = 0 if the item is not disclosed), 
 MVD = Maximum applicable Voluntary Disclosure score, 
 n = number of items disclosed. 
 
3.2. Measurements of Independent and Control Variables 
The definitions and measurements of the independent and control 
variables are displayed in Table (1). 
 
Table (1): Measurements of the Independent and control Variables 
Variables Acronym Measurement 
Board 
Independence BOIND 
Proportion of independent (non-executive) 
directors on the board 
Board Size BOSIZE The number of board members. 
Board 
Meetings BOMEET Total number of board meetings per year 
Role Duality ROLDU Dummy variable; (1) if bank's CEO serves as a board chairman, (0) otherwise. 
Bank Age BAGE Natural logarithm of the number of years from 
 inception until 2017 . Ln (bank age + 1) 
Bank Size BSIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
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Bank 
Profitability BPROF ROA = Net income /average of total assets 
Bank 
Leverage BLEVE Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Source : Prepared by the authors based on prior studies 
The research framework and the relationship among research 
variables are shown in figure (1). 
 
Figure (1): The research framework 
 
                          Independent Variables                                                  Dependent Variable                              
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         Control Variables           
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
3.2. Model Development  
To investigate the relationship between the board of directors 
characteristics and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
listed banks in Borsa Istanbul, the following model is formed in equation 
(2). 
 
VDIit = β0 + β1 BOINDit + β2 BOSIZEit + β3 BOMEETit + β4 ROLDUit 
+ β5 BAGEit + β6 BSIZEit + β7 BPROFit + β8 BLEVEit + Єit  ………..(2) 
 
Where: 
 VDI = Voluntary Disclosure Index; 
 i = 13 Banks 
 t = 5 Time Periods (2013-2017)  
 β0 = Intercept; 
 β1 to β8= Coefficient of slope parameters; 
 BOIND = Board  Independence;  
The Extent of  
Voluntary Disclosure 
 Board Independence  
 Board Size 
 Board Meetings 
 Role Duality 
 Bank Age 
 Bank Size 
 Bank Profitability 
 Bank Leverage 
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 BOSIZE = Board Size;  
 BOMEET = Board Meetings; 
 ROLDU = Role Duality; 
 BAGE = Bank Age; 
 BSIZE = Bank Size; 
 BPROF = Bank  Profitability; 
 BLEVE = Bank Leverage; 
 Є = Error term. 
 
4. Analysis and Results 
Univariate and multivariate statistical analyses were applied to 
analyze the data and to test the research hypotheses. 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
Two kinds of univariate analysis were adopted; the descriptive 
statistics and correlation analysis. 
4.1.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The average of the level of voluntary disclosure index (VDI) of all 
banks over the study period was about 77%. The proportion of (BOIND) 
ranges between 14% and 43% with an average of about 28%. This 
percentage is less than the recommended proportion  from Turkish corporate 
governance principles (33%) (CMB, 2003), which implies that the 
proportion of  independent directors in some banks is less than one-third. 
The average of (BOSIZE) was 10,  this means that most board sizes are 
large. The average of (BOMEET) was about 20 meetings per year. The 
average of (ROLDU) was 0.06, indicating that most banks separated 
between the roles of CEO and chairman. The descriptive statistics for the 
research variables are displayed in Table (2). 
 
Table (2): Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
VDI 0.766 0.09095 0.40 0.86 
BOIND 0.279 0.07153 0.14 0.43 
BOSIZE 10.31 2.243 6 14 
BOMEET 20.48 13.686 4 89 
ROLDU 0.06 0.242 0 1 
BAGE* 4.01 0.3950 3.260 4.530 
BSIZE** 24.90 1.40798 21.99 26.62 
BPROF 0.013 0.00556 -0.003 0.028 
BLEVE 0.89 0.02345 0.83 0.93 
        * Natural logarithm of bank age. 
          ** Natural logarithm of total assets 
Source: by the authors based on the study data and STATA software output 
It can be seen that, from Table (3), there is a slight growth in the 
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average of VDI during the study period. Table (3) displays the trends of the 
averages of the research variables for all banks during the five-year period 
from 2013 to 2017. 
 
Table (3): Trends of the averages of the research variables during the five-year period. 
Variable 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
VDI 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.78 
BOIND 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 
BOSIZE 10.38 10.38 10.23 10.31 10.23 
BOMEET 19.55 19.69 20.85 20.97 21.35 
ROLDU 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
BAGE* 3.97 3.99 4.01 4.03 4.05 
BSIZE** 24.56 24.70 24.91 25.06 25.28 
BPROF 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.014 
BLEVE 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 
            * Natural logarithm of bank age. 
            ** Natural logarithm of total assets 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the study data and STATA software output 
 
4.1.2. Correlation Analysis 
Dancey & Reidy (2017) recommended that before performing the 
multiple regression analysis, it is important to apply a correlation matrix to 
discover any relationship between voluntary disclosure and each board of 
directors and bank characteristic. The results of the Pearson correlation 
displayed in Table (4) show that voluntary disclosure (VDI) is significantly 
and negatively associated with BOIND and has a positive relationship with 
BOSIZE at a confidence level of 95%. With respect to the other two 
independent variables, the results indicated that no significant relationships 
between them and voluntary disclosure. The results also reveals that all 
bank characteristics have significant and positive relationships with 
voluntary disclosure (VDI). 
 
Table (4): Pearson Correlation Analysis. 
 VDI BOIND BOSIZE BOMEET ROLDU BAGE BSIZE BPROF 
VDI 1        
BOIND -0.262* 1       
BOSIZE 0.457* -0.791* 1      
BOMEET 0.163 0.542* -0.362* 1     
ROLDU -0.153 0.420* -0.380* 0.088 1    
BAGE 0.687* -0.230 0.272* 0.270* -0.202 1   
BSIZE 0.784* -0.331* 0.383* 0.036 -0.441* 0.637* 1  
BPROF 0.495* -0.059 0.132 0.325* -0.037 0.414* 0.306* 1 
BLEVE 0.266* -0.242 0.309* -0.092 -0.330* -0.028 0.298* -0.377* 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the study data and STATA software output 
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4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
The multivariate analysis is applied to investigate the impacts of a 
number of independent variables on one dependent variable. In this paper, 
multiple regression analysis was used to examine the influences of board of 
directors characteristics on the level of voluntary disclosure. In panel data 
analysis, it is necessary to test the regression assumptions before running the 
multiple regression analysis. Aljandali & Tatahi (2018) recommended four 
assumptions which must be checked before applying the regression model; 
the Normality of the Residuals,  Multicollinearity, Homoskedasticity, and 
Autocorrelation. These assumptions were checked using STATA 15.1 
software. 
4.2.1. Testing the Normality of Residuals 
The result of the Shapiro-Wilk test illustrated in Table (5) shows that 
the P-values is greater than 0.05, as well as it can be observed that from the 
histogram in Figure (2) the model residuals seem to be normally distributed. 
 
Table (5): The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality 
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
Residuals 65 0.96672 1.929 1.423 0.07739 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the study data and STATA software output 
                
Figure (2): Histogram of the residuals 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the study data and STATA software output 
 
4.2.2. Checking for Multicollinearity 
The rule is if the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of a variable is 
more than 10, the variable is considered to be highly collinear (Gujarati & 
Porter, 2009; Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). From Table (6), it can be observed 
that all the VIF numbers are smaller than 10 including the mean of VIF. 
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Hence, the multicollinearity problem does not exist in the data. 
 
Table (6): The (VIF) Results of the independent variables 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
BOIND 3.9 0.256135 
BOSIZE 2.99 0.333968 
BSIZE 2.55 0.39189 
BAGE 2.33 0.428628 
BOMEET 2.28 0.437814 
BPROF 1.9 0.525133 
BLEVE 1.87 0.534932 
ROLDU 1.49 0.672518 
Mean VIF 2.42  
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the study data and STATA software output 
 
4.2.3. Homoskedasticity Assumption   
The Breusch-Pagan test is used to test heteroskedasticity. This test is 
reliable, especially if the assumption of normality is met (Gujarati & Porter, 
2009). The null hypothesis is that the variance of the residuals is 
homogenous. The results of the Breusch-Pagan test shown in Table (7) 
indicated that the P-value was (0.0000), meaning that the null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
Table (7): Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroskedasticity 
H0: Constant variance 
chi2(8) 109.16 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the study data and STATA software output 
 
Also, the results of White's test show the same results of the 
Breusch-Pagan test as displayed in Table (8), which means that the 
heteroskedasticity problem exists. 
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Table (8): White's test for Heteroskedasticity 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
Source chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 63.70 39 0.0075 
Skewness 9.15 8 0.3296 
Kurtosis 2.39 1 0.1225 
Total 75.23 48 0.0072 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the study data and STATA software output 
 
4.2.4. Checking for Autocorrelation 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (first-order-
autocorrelation) was applied. It can be seen that in Table (9) the P-value = 
(0.1130) meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected and there is no 
autocorrelation among the observations. 
 
Table (9): Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F(1, 12) 2.924 
Prob > F 0.1130 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the study data and STATA software output 
 
4.2.5. Multiple Regression Analysis 
As mention above, the residuals are normally distributed and there is 
no multicollinearity and serial correlation. However, the heteroskedasticity 
problem exists. The OLS regression model will be biased and will fail to be 
the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) when the heteroskedasticity 
exists. Hence, the results would be unreliable and misleading (Bentes & 
Menezes, 2013; Ghasempour & MdYusof, 2014; Gourieroux & Monfort, 
1997; Gujarati & Porter, 2009; O’Hara & Parmeter, 2013). Therefore, the 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) can be applied instead of OLS as an 
alternative regression model (Aljandali & Tatahi, 2018; Boslaugh & 
Watters, 2008; Gourieroux & Monfort, 1997) because it can be the BLUE 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009; O’Hara & Parmeter, 2013). When the 
heteroskedasticity problem exists, Cameron & Trivedi (2009) and 
Westerlund & Narayan (2012) suggested using Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares model (FGLS) because it works better than OLS (Bentes & 
Menezes, 2013) and gives efficient estimators (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009; 
Miller & Startz, 2018). Consequently, the FGLS longitudinal panel 
regression was applied by using STATA software 15.1 as displayed in Table 
(10). 
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Table (10): The results of FGLS regression for panel data. 
VDI Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.  Interval] 
BOIND 0.266038 0.118341 2.25 0.025 0.034094 0.497983 
BOSIZE 0.012893 0.003306 3.9 0.000 0.006414 0.019372 
BOMEET 0.097684 0.02157 4.53 0.000 0.055407 0.13996 
ROLDU -0.00019 0.000473 -0.41 0.680 -0.00112 0.000732 
BAGE 0.061744 0.01656 3.73 0.000 0.029287 0.094202 
BSIZE 0.031505 0.00486 6.48 0.000 0.021978 0.041031 
BPROF 5.463571 1.062919 5.14 0.000 3.380287 7.546854 
BLEVE 1.12608 0.249758 4.51 0.000 0.636563 1.615598 
_cons -1.5483 0.217244 -7.13 0.000 -1.97409 -1.12251 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the study data and STATA software output 
 
The results of the FGLS regression model in the table (10) show that 
the Wald chi2 (8) = (385.76) and the log likelihood = (127.0415), as well as, 
the P-value of the whole model is highly significant with the value of 
(0.0000). The FGLS results in Table 10 show that board independence, 
board size and board meetings are positively and significantly associated 
with the level of voluntary disclosure, whilst role duality has a negative and 
nonsignificant relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure. The 
findings also indicate that the p-value of all control variables (bank 
characteristics: age, size, profitability, and leverage) is highly significant 
with a very small value of (0.000) which meaning that they are positively 
and significantly related with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Voluntary disclosures are the focus of accounting literature in recent 
years. Voluntary disclosure improves transparency and helps to minimize 
the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders which leads to 
decreasing asymmetry problem and managers’ opportunistic behaviors. 
Board of directors is viewed as an effective corporate governance 
mechanism, and also as one of the important factors impacting the level of 
voluntary disclosure. Thus, this study aims to examine the relationship 
between board characteristics (board independence, board size, board 
meetings and role duality) and the level of voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports of listed banks in Borsa Istanbul during the period from 2013 to 
2017.  
The results of the Pearson correlation indicate that voluntary 
disclosure is negatively and significantly related with board independence 
and positively associated with board size, whilst board meetings and role 
duality have nonsignificant relationship with the level of voluntary 
disclosure. The results of Pearson correlation also reveal that control 
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variables have significant and positive relationships with voluntary 
disclosure. 
The FGLS regression was applied for panel data to avoid the effect 
of the heteroskedasticity problem. The FGLS results indicate that board 
independence, board size and board meetings have positive and significant 
association with the level of voluntary disclosure, whilst role duality is 
negatively and no significantly associated with the level of voluntary 
disclosure. FGLS regression results also show that all bank characteristics 
are positively and significantly associated with the level of voluntary 
disclosure. 
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Appendix No. (1): Items of Voluntary Disclosure Index 
A. General and Strategic Information 
(17): 
- A brief narrative history of the bank 
- General information about the economic 
environment 
- Information about the banking sector 
- Year of listing at Borsa Istanbul 
- Description of major services 
- Address of bank/telephone/fax 
- Bank website address 
- Email address 
- Date and details of establishment 
- General outlook of business activities 
- Number of branches 
 -List of branches location 
- Dividend policy 
- Information on ATM 
- Statement of overall strategies and 
objectives 
- Future strategy 
- Information about market share 
B. Directors and Managers Information 
(15): 
- Chairman of the board identified 
- List of board members 
- Disclosure information on board members’ 
qualifications and experience 
- Duties of board of members 
- List of senior managers (not on the board 
of members) / senior management structure 
- Sponsoring public health 
- Sponsoring sport activities 
- Sponsoring cultural recreations 
- Sponsoring education 
- Charitable donations and aid 
D. Financial Performance (15): 
- Brief discussion of the bank’s operating 
results 
- Analysis of bank’s liquidity position 
- Return on assets 
- Share price at the year-end 
- Return on equity 
- Liquidity coverage ratio 
- Earnings per share 
- Capital adequacy ratio 
- Loan to deposit ratio 
- Total dividends 
- Dividend per share for the period 
- Comparative Income statement for 2 years 
- Comparative balance sheet for 2 years 
- Comparative current year and previous 
year figures 
- Inflation effects 
E. Accounting Policies (7): 
- Accounting Valuation of fixed assets (e.g., 
fair value or historical cost) 
- The depreciation methods used 
- Foreign currency transactions, translation 
and differences treatment 
- Disclosure of accounting standards uses for 
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- Disclosure information on senior 
managers’ qualifications and experience 
- Managers’ engagement/directorship of 
other companies 
- Picture of all senior managers 
- Picture of chairperson 
- Information about changes in board 
members 
- Classification of managers as executive or 
outsider 
- Details of senior managers and board of 
members remuneration 
- Shares held by directors 
- Chairman’s statement 
- Number of board meetings held and date 
C. Social Responsibility Information (6): 
- Environmental and social policies 
its accounts 
- Statements of compliance with approved 
IFRS/IASs 
- Treatment of Tax 
- Treatment of contingent liabilities. 
F. Other Information (4): 
- Statement of percentage of total 
shareholder of 20 largest shareholders 
- A review of shareholders by type (for 
example, institutions, individuals, ..., etc) 
- Number of shareholders 
- Dividend declared 
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